We model a lender-borrower relationship in a CSV framework. The project available with the firm is characterized by first-order stochastic dominance. The lender audits the borrower to prevent the latter from strategic default.
Introduction
In the last three decades, significant attention has been drawn toward agency problems that affect the financial performance of a firm. One such area is how asymmetric information between various stakeholders in a fn'm affects the optimal financial contracts, the optimal investment decisions, and the capital structure. In this paper we develop a lender-borrower relationship to address some of these issues.
In our model, the lenders monitor the fu-m in "bad states." Here, monitoring by the lender is equivalent to a commitment to verify or audit the realization reported by the borrower. The only source of asymmetric information in our model is the project realization. The lender audits the firm to prevent the latter from undertaking strategic default (Bolton and Scharfstein 1995). In our model, the probability of default is influenced by the scale of financing. We assume that, the higher the investment made, the higher the probability that the project will succeed. The total investment in the project can be viewed as the fund required to purchase machinery and technology, improve human resources, etc. This means that, the better the quality of these resources, acquired by more investments, the higher the probability that the project will succeed. In other words, we assume that firms capable of raising more capital are less likely to fail. We * Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay, Management Development Institute, Sukhraii, Gurgaon 122 001, India, bappa@radi.ac.in. The work is based on the author's Ph.D. dissertation submitted at the Indian Statistical Institute. The author wishes to thank Shubhashis Gangopadhyay and the seminar participants at the Indian Statistical Institute, Jawahadal Nehru University, MDI, and NIILM for useful comments on the earlier draft. The paper has also benefit',ed immensely from the valuable insights povided by the three anonymous referees of the journal. The remaining errors are mine. derive our results under two extreme scenarios--a monopoly lender and a perfectly competitive lender. The main results in our paper are: 9 the debt contract is the optimal contract; 9 the debt contract leads to overinvestment; 9 the extent of inefficiency due to overinvestment may actually increase with an increase in the monitoring costs; and, 9 however, if the lenders lend through equity contract, there is underinvestment.
The optimality of the standard debt contract (SDC) is the more frequently obtained result in the literature. The early work that addresses the problem of monitoring and optimality of debt contract is Gale and Hellwig (1985) . Some of the prominent works that establish the optimality of the debt contract with monitoring costs include Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 , Boyd and Smith (1994) , Yan (1996) , Park (2000), Faure-Grimaud (2000) , and, most recently, Gehrsbach and Uhlig (2001). In Boyd and Smith (1994) , the debt contract is the "nearly optimal" contract even in the face of stochastic auditing. Yah (1996) establishes that debt contract is optimal with high bankruptcy cost and random monitoring. Park (2000) addresses the issue of priority in claims, and Faure-Grimaud (2000) addresses the problem of strategic interaction in product market and the financial structure. However, in a recent paper, Gehrsbach and Uhlig (2001) establish that a monopoly lender will always offer an equity contract. In their framework, borrowers are characterized by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Two factors drive their result: (1) the lenders have fixed cost of lending to investing borrowers, and (2) the lenders can costlessly observe the output.
The overinvestment result contradicts most other works in the literature. Most works derive that monitoring by lenders leads to underinvestment. The basic underinvestment result was first formalized by Myers (1977) . The conflict between the shareholders and bondholders gives rise to a problem of underinvestment by moral hazard. Given the priority of bondholders in case of bankruptcy, shareholders may find themselves in a situation where bondholders appropriate part of the value created. Therefore, shareholders will have an incentive to abandon positive net present value (NPV) projects whenever the NPV is lower than the amount of debt issued.
The early work that establishes equilibrium credit rationing with asymmetric information is due to Jaffee and Russell (1976) and subsequently Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . Credit rationing in these models acts as a screening device between good and bad borrowers. Our model is closer to Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Williamson (1986 and 1987) , Mukherji and Nagarajan (1995 ), Yan (1996 ), and Biais and Casamatta (1999 . In these papers, costly state verification (CSV) framework leads to underinvestment with the standard debt contract--the reason being, with costly monitoring to encounter the moral hazard problems, the lending decision internalizes this cost, thereby reducing the aggregate investment in the project. In Gale and Hellwig (1985) , the source of moral hazard is underreporting of the entrepreneur's return. In Williamson (1986 Williamson ( , 1987 , while some borrowers get credit, others do not) In Mukherji and Nagarajan (1995), underinvestment occurs when it is not ex-ante feasible for the principal to impose contractual restrictions on the agent. In Yan (1996) , the lending decision takes into account the monitoring costs. However, it differs from this study with respect to the factors that influence default probability. While the level of investment affects the default probability in our model, it does not in the other papers in the literature. Therefore, the equilibrium credit rationing leads to underinvestment. In Biais and Casamatta (1999) , managerial effort is unobservable. Lower managerial effort implies a higher bankruptcy probability.
In contrast, not too many papers derive overinvestment in CSV frameworks. In De Meza and Webb (1987) , the banks are competitive, earning zero profits in equilibrium. Further, with different expected returns across projects, the bank does not bother about returns from the risky Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) call this "true" rationing.
